AUG-SEp 2024

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HIGHLIGHTS

• The violence continues unabated in Israel’s defense against Hamas and Hezbollah
  attacks. The region remains a tinderbox, ready to ignite into a larger conflict.
• The Israeli Air Force conducted additional retaliatory strikes against Hezbollah
  positions in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah is increasingly using FPV drones for surveillance and strike missions
  along the Israeli border.
• To counter Hezbollah’s use of FPV strike drones, Israel is pushing to develop
  better offensive and defensive drone combat capabilities.
• A tale of two offensives: While Ukraine presses ahead in the Kursk salient, Russia
  pushes for gains near Pokrovsk.
• Russia continues to develop new electronic warfare technologies, including a tool
  that protects equipment against enemy jamming.
• While Ukraine’s drone warfare technology and tactics have rapidly evolved since
  2022, there’s quite a few opportunities for improvement. We have them outlined,
  along with suggested solutions.
• Given the lethality of the surface warfighting environment, Ukraine has developed
  a new underground casualty collection point model that will soon have an expanded
  presence across the war zone.

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EDITOR's NOTES

This week saw a series of attention-grabbing Ukrainian drone warfare innovations that, once again, underscored the enterprising spirit of Ukrainian soldiers to “MacGyver” creative solutions to solve their battlefield problems. Videos released to social media showed Ukrainian drones dousing Russian positions with a molten rain of thermite incendiary — a new weapons system called the “Dragon’s Breath.” We saw videos of a Ukrainian-made Hornet Queen heavy-lift drone, modified to carry an AK-74 assault rifle, attacking Russian positions. The pro- Ukraine Georgian Legion also posted a video of a drone firing an RPG-7 from its launcher.

Notably, the “Signum” unit from Ukraine’s 93rd Brigade reported that their FPVs downed 49 Russian fixed-wing UAVs. Among that number was one Lancet loitering munition. This marks a breakthrough in the Ukrainians’ use of FPVs in air defense roles, as Russia’s Lancets have long plagued Ukrainian operations for dozens of kilometers behind the actual line of contact. In a Telegram post that featured a video montage of its recent air-to-air kills, the Signum unit wrote: “The potential of FPVs cannot be overestimated!”

Ukraine’s lack of short-range air defenses has been a major problem for quite some time. Without an effective means to defend the air littoral, the Ukrainians are vulnerable to Russian strike drones, as well as Russian fixed-wing ISR drones directing artillery and precision strikes. This creates a specter of lethal danger that extends some 50 kilometers from the line of contact and imposes significant logistical and operational constraints on Ukrainian forces, not the least of which is constant psychological pressure suffered by Ukrainian troops trapped living under persistent, lethal danger. Short of a surge in Western air defense system deliveries, the Ukrainians have reverted to doing what they do best — they adapt what they have on hand to meet their immediate battlefield needs. The meteoric pace at which Ukraine is adapting its FPV tactics and technologies to meet its air defense shortfalls is a case study in the country’s adaptive advantage against Russia — a trait that has, to date, offset many of its quantitative disadvantages.

The Ukrainians’ innovation cycle is a bottom-up process, inspired and driven by front-line soldiers who maintain active lines of communication with the technical innovators who support them. New technologies are not chosen by central military planners in Kyiv — nor are they steered by panels of think-tank experts or corporate boards. They’re born from the minds of troops going toe-to-toe with their enemies every day.

Working closely with their unique coterie of tech innovators and volunteer groups, Ukraine’s front-line soldiers mold and re-mold their technological requests to specifically solve their units’ unique problem sets. Things like the physical terrain within which they operate (is it wooded or urban or wide-open steppe?), as well as the characteristics of the Russian forces they face. These variables are not uniform across the length of the front line, and a new tactic or technology that works for one unit may not be effective at another location. Consequently, expensive, over-engineered, cure-all platforms are rarely popular across the force. Soldiers often prefer low-cost, bespoke solutions to their specific problem sets.

This inherent trend toward a diversity of innovations makes it hard to condense lessons from Ukraine’s drone war into a single doctrine. The drone warfare ecosystem is simply too diverse — and that’s without extrapolating how all these tactics and technologies will apply to other warfighting environments, such as in the mountains at high-altitude, or in amphibious operations, or in the Arctic.

Despite its complexity, Ukraine’s innovation landscape does have its upsides. For one, it allows Ukrainian units to adapt their tactics and technologies at the proverbial “speed of war” — typically outpacing their Russian adversaries, who have a much more centrally-planned approach. Ukrainians also benefit from the modular approach they apply to their innovations. Rather than pursuing a single Wunderwaffe to win the war, Ukraine’s innovators zoom in on the immediate needs of specific units, and the exigencies of specific battlefields. The technologies they develop are never final versions — they are akin to balls of clay being constantly remolded based on end- users’ needs and feedback.

Thus, Ukraine is steadily amassing a broad encyclopedia of drone warfare wisdom, based on years of trial-and-error experimentation in a wide range of contingencies. The challenge, then, is to collect and codify all these “lessons learned” into an accessible resource. Small- and medium-sized unmanned technologies (in the air, at sea, and on land) will no doubt play a role in future conflicts. Yet, we should not fixate on technology as a war-winning strategy. Each week, these pages reinforce the importance of honing the doctrines and the warfighting cultures necessary to dominate the unmanned battlefield.

Our mission at the Vector Report is to collect, collate, and analyze the lessons learned from Ukraine and other battlefields to support the U.S. and our partners and allies in that effort.

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